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Summary
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs),
chartered by Congress to establish a secondary mortgage market in order to improve
the distribution of capital available for home mortgage financing.  To help these
privately-owned institutions accomplish this mission, Congress granted them several
statutory benefits not available to other private companies.  The advantages of GSE
status have helped the enterprises to grow very large and dominate the secondary
mortgage market.
In 1992, Congress established the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise
Oversight (OFHEO), an agency within the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD), to oversee the financial safety and soundness of the enterprises.
OFHEO is authorized to set capital requirements, conduct annual risk-based
examinations, and generally enforce compliance with safety and soundness standards.
With the rapid growth of the GSEs, and major accounting scandals at Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac, the effectiveness of the current regulatory regime has been
widely questioned.  Several legislative proposals considered in the 108th and earlier
Congresses addressed GSE regulatory reform, but none was enacted.  However,
adequacy of GSE regulation remains a prominent legislative issue.
While improving supervision of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is the major
focus, regulatory reform also involves the 12 Federal Home Loan Banks, which
comprise one collective GSE.  The Federal Home Loan Banks lend to lenders —
their member banks — primarily for housing, but also for many other purposes.
Under the proposed GSE reform, they would be brought under a single regulatory
umbrella with Fannie and Freddie.
In the 109th Congress, S. 190 (Senators Hagel, Sununu, and Dole) and H.R. 1461
(Representatives Baker and Oxley) propose to restructure the GSE supervisor and
enhance its regulatory powers.  (H.R. 1461 was marked up and reported by the
Financial Services Committee on May 25, 2005, with an amendment in the nature of
a substitute offered by Chairman Oxley.)  Other bills are expected to be introduced.
In brief, S. 190 and H.R. 1461 would
! abolish OFHEO and establish an independent agency to oversee the
housing GSEs and the Federal Home Loan Banks;
! enhance the safety and soundness, disclosure, and enforcement tools
available to the new regulator; and
! increase the budget autonomy of the new agency by exempting its
assessments from the annual appropriations process.
This report summarizes legislative proposals in the 109th Congress that aim to
strengthen the regulation of the GSEs, and will be updated as warranted.
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1 Although GSE bonds are not explicitly backed by the full faith and credit of the
government, market participants behave as if they were, believing that the Treasury will
never permit a GSE to default.  This implicit guarantee allows the GSEs to borrow at lower
rates than private financial institutions, and to take on greater financial risk without a
corresponding drop in their credit ratings.
2 The other GSEs are the Federal Home Loan Bank System, the Farm Credit System, and
Farmer Mac.  Sallie Mae, a former GSE, has been fully privatized.
3 For a detailed description of the development of the U.S. secondary mortgage market, see
Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, Report to Congress, June 2003, at
[http://www.ofheo.gov/media/pdf/WEBsiteOFHEOREPtoCongress03.pdf].
4 These statutory benefits include (1) exemption from state and local taxes, (2) a line of
credit with the U.S. Treasury up to $2.25 billion, (3) eligibility of their debt to serve as
collateral for public deposits, (4) eligibility of their securities for Federal Reserve open
market purchases, (5) eligibility for their corporate securities to be purchased without limit
by federally regulated financial institutions, (6) assignment of mortgage-related securities
they have issued or guaranteed to the second-lowest credit risk category at depository
institutions, and (7) exemption from the registration requirements of the Securities and
Exchange Commission.
5  For more information on these advantages, see the following reports: U.S. Department of
the Treasury, Government Sponsorship of the Federal National Mortgage Association and
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, July 11, 1996; U.S. Congressional Budget
Office, Assessing the Public Costs and Benefits of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, May 1996;





Government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) are privately owned, congressionally
chartered financial institutions created for specific public policy purposes.  They
benefit from certain exemptions and privileges, including an implied federal
guarantee,1 intended to enhance their ability to borrow money.  Two of the largest
GSEs are Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (herein referred to as the enterprises or
GSEs).2  These institutions were created by Congress to establish and maintain a
secondary mortgage market, increasing liquidity and improving the distribution of
capital available for home mortgage financing.3  To help these institutions
accomplish this mission, Congress has provided them with several benefits not
available to other financial institutions.4  These statutory benefits provide the
enterprises with lower funding costs, the ability to operate with less capital, and
lower direct costs.5  The advantages of GSE status have enabled the enterprises to
grow rapidly and become dominant players in the secondary mortgage market.  
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6 Based on 2003 annual reports.  Fannie Mae’s accounts are in the process of restatement.
7 For more information, see Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight,  FY 2003-2008
Strategic Plan, Sept. 30, 2003, at [http://www.ofheo.gov/media/pdf/0308stratplan93003a.
pdf].
8 For a comprehensive analysis of these risks, see Office of Federal Housing Enterprise
Oversight,  Systemic Risk: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Role of OFHEO, Feb. 2003,
at [http://www.ofheo.gov/media/archive/docs/reports/sysrisk.pdf].  Furthermore, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) has stated that the GSE “regulators need to look closely
at whether agencies’ capital adequacy is sufficient, especially bearing in mind the questions
about internal controls that have emerged in Freddie Mac.... [I]t is unclear whether [the
GSEs] have taken sufficient account of the risk that the market may not be deep enough to
allow them to continuously hedge their growing portfolios in times of stress.”  For more
information, see IMF, Global Financial Stability Report: Market Developments and Issues,
Sept. 2003, pp. 16-22, at [http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2003/02/index.htm].
9  For more information, see CRS Report RS21567, Accounting and Management Problems
at Freddie Mac, by Mark Jickling.
Congress has always been concerned that the safety and soundness of the
enterprises be maintained so that they can meet their public policy mission and not
pose risks to taxpayers.  Prior to 1992, oversight was the responsibility of the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board.  In 1992, Congress established the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise
Oversight (OFHEO), an independent agency within HUD, to oversee the financial
safety and soundness of the enterprises.  The office is authorized to set capital
requirements, conduct annual risk-based examinations, and generally enforce
compliance with safety and soundness standards.
Since the creation of OFHEO, total assets at the GSEs have grown by more than
820% to $1.9 trillion.6  The GSEs have become two of the largest private debt issuers
in the world.  At the end of 2003, outstanding debt securities of the enterprises
totaled $1.7 trillion — an amount equal to almost half of all publicly held federal
debt.  In addition to enterprise debt, investors hold about $1.7 trillion in mortgage-
backed securities issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.7  
As a result of the rapid growth of these institutions and their implied federal
backing, there has been an increasing concern that the enterprises may pose a
problem of systemic risk to the financial system.8  Many financial institutions around
the world hold large quantities of GSE debt and default by either GSE could have
widespread, unpredictable, and potentially serious repercussions. Accordingly,
questions have been raised about the effectiveness of the current regulatory
environment.  There have been several legislative proposals introduced in the past
to address these issues, but Congress did not take action on them. 
Events in the past two years, however, have brought a new urgency to this issue.
In 2003, Freddie Mac admitted that it had used improper accounting policies to create
the appearance of steady earnings growth and issued a restatement of financial
results, revising net income for 2000-2002 upwards by $5 billion.9  OFHEO imposed
a $125 million fine and is pursuing civil actions against several former Freddie
executives.  
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10 Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, Report of Findings to Date: Special
Examination of Fannie Mae, Sept. 17, 2004, available at [http://www.ofheo.gov/media/
pdf/FNMfindingstodate17sept04.pdf].
11 For a discussion of OFHEO’s findings, see CRS Report RS21949, Accounting Problems
at Fannie Mae, by Mark Jickling. 
12  In some versions, the new regulator was to have authority over the FHLBs, as well as
Fannie and Freddie.
Following the special examination of Freddie Mac, OFHEO began to review the
accounting policies and practices at Fannie Mae, and published its preliminary
findings in September 2004.10  OFHEO charges that Fannie Mae did not follow
generally accepted accounting practices in two critical areas: (1) amortization of
discounts, premiums, and fees involved in the purchase of home mortgages and (2)
accounting for financial derivatives contracts.  According to OFHEO, these
deviations from standard accounting rules allowed Fannie Mae to reduce volatility
in reported earnings, present investors with an artificial picture of steadily growing
profits, and, in at least one case, to meet financial performance targets that triggered
the payment of bonuses to company executives.11  On December 15, 2004, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) directed Fannie Mae to restate its
accounting results since 2001 after finding inadequacies in Fannie’s accounting
policies and methodologies. Fannie Mae’s CEO and CFO stepped down soon
thereafter.  These accounting scandals, and the safety and soundness concerns they
raise, have made GSE regulatory reform a prominent legislative issue once again. 
While problems at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have provided the main
impetus for reform, the regulation of the Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBs) may
also be affected.  The 12 FHLBs comprise one collective government-sponsored
enterprise. Originally chartered by Congress to provide liquidity to the nation’s
predominant lenders for home mortgage loans — savings and loan associations and
savings banks — the FHLBs have undergone a series of changes over the years as
financial institutions have changed.  Still a lender to lenders primarily for housing,
the FHLBs can now lend for many other purposes as well, and have special
responsibilities for low- and moderate-income housing, for debts incurred by the
federal government in handling deposit insurance crises of the 1970s and 1980s, and
for some community development projects. 
Several bills were considered in the 108th Congress that would have restructured
OFHEO. While the proposals took somewhat different approaches to regulatory
reform, all appeared to
! abolish OFHEO and reconstitute the GSE regulator within the
Department of the Treasury, or as an independent agency;12 
! increase the budget autonomy of the new office by exempting its
assessments from the annual appropriations process; and
! enhance the safety and soundness and enforcement tools available
to the new regulator. 
CRS-4
13 Prepared testimony of John W. Snow, Secretary of the Treasury, in: U.S. Congress, Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Proposals for Improving the Regulation
of the Housing GSEs, hearings, 108th Cong., 1st sess., Oct. 16, 2003, p. 2, at
[http://banking.senate.gov/_files/ACFB2.pdf].
14 Prepared testimony of Alan Greenspan in: U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, Proposals for Improving the Regulation of the Housing
Government Sponsored Enterprises, hearings, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., Feb. 24, 2004, p. 9,
at [http://banking.senate.gov/_files/ACF1BA.pdf].
15 E.g., Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
before the House Committee on Financial Services, Feb. 17, 2005.
None of these bills, whose provisions are summarized in CRS Report RL32069,
Improving the Effectiveness of GSE Oversight: Legislative Proposals in the 108th
Congress, was enacted.
The Bush Administration has generally supported GSE regulatory reform.
Treasury Secretary John Snow appeared before the House Financial Services
Committee on September 10, 2003, and then again before the Senate Banking
Committee on October 16, 2003, to outline the Administration’s recommendations
“for the essential, minimum requirements for a credible regulator”13 for the housing
GSEs.  In addition to the creation of a new agency to oversee the safety and
soundness of all the housing GSEs (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home
Loan Banks), the Treasury Secretary outlined several recommendations intended to
strengthen the new agency’s general regulatory, supervisory and enforcement powers.
However, in testimony before the Senate Banking Committee, Federal Reserve
Board Chairman Alan Greenspan noted that “[w]orld-class regulation, by itself, may
not be sufficient and indeed, as suggested by Treasury Secretary Snow, may even
worsen the situation if market participants infer from such regulation that the
government is all the more likely to back GSE debt.”14  Concerned that this may
encourage continued asset growth in the enterprises, posing a potential risk to the
financial system, the Federal Reserve Board Chairman has repeatedly urged Congress
to consider ways to shrink the size of the GSEs’ asset portfolios.15   The bills
summarized here do not explicitly require Fannie and Freddie to reduce the size of
their portfolios, but do give the new regulator authority over the acquisition or sale
of assets under certain circumstances.
This report provides a summary of legislative proposals introduced in the 109th
Congress that aim to strengthen the regulation of the enterprises.  
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Table 1.  Provisions of GSE Reform Legislation
Provision H.R. 1461 (as reported) H.R. 1461 (as introduced) S. 190
Short Title Federal Housing Finance Reform Act of
2005
Federal Housing Finance Reform Act of
2005
Federal Housing Enterprise Regulatory
Act of 2005
Subtitle A: Improvement of Safety and Soundness Regulation.
Name of New
Regulatory Agency
Federal Housing Finance Agency 
(Sec. 101)
Federal Housing Finance Agency 
(Sec. 101)
Federal Housing Enterprise Regulatory
Agency   (Sec. 101)
Agency Status Independent federal agency  (Sec. 101) Independent federal agency  (Sec. 101) Independent federal agency   (Sec. 101)
Jurisdiction General supervisory and regulatory
authority over Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac,
and the Federal Home Loan Banks.  
(Sec. 101)
General supervisory and regulatory
authority over Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac,
the Federal Home Loan Banks, and the
Federal Home Loan Bank Finance
Corporation.  (Sec. 101)
General regulatory authority over Fannie
Mae, Freddie Mac, the Federal Home
Loan Banks, and the Federal Home Loan
Bank Finance Corporation.  (Sec. 101)
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Provision H.R. 1461 (as reported) H.R. 1461 (as introduced) S. 190
Key Definitions Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, their affiliates,
and the Federal Home Loan Banks are
defined as “regulated entities.”  The term
“enterprise” —  used frequently in H.R.
1461 — is defined in current law to mean
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  
“Regulated entity-affiliated party”
includes (1) directors, officers, employees,
agents, and controlling shareholders of
regulated entities;  (2) any shareholder,
consultant, joint venture partner, or other
person (as determined by the Director)
that participates in the affairs of a
regulated entity; (3)  independent
contractors (including attorneys,
appraisers, or accountants) and (4) non-
profits that receive principal funding, on
an ongoing basis,  from any regulated
entity.  (Sec. 101)
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, their affiliates,
and the Federal Home Loan Banks are
defined as “regulated entities.”  The term
“enterprise” —  used frequently in H.R.
1461 — is defined in current law to mean
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.   “Regulated
entity-affiliated party” includes (1)
directors, officers, employees, agents, and
controlling shareholders of regulated
entities;  (2) any shareholder, consultant,
joint venture partner, or other person (as
determined by the Director) that
participates in the affairs of a regulated
entity; (3)  independent contractors (such as
attorneys or accountants) who knowingly
or recklessly participate in violations of law
or regulation, breaches of fiduciary duty, or
unsafe and unsound practices that have a
significant adverse impact on a regulated
entity; and (4) non-profits that receive
principal funding, on an ongoing basis,
from any regulated entity.  (Sec. 101)
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, their affiliates,
and the Federal Home Loan Banks are
defined as “regulated entities.”   (Under
current law, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
are defined as “enterprises” — many
provisions of S. 190 refer only to them.) 
“Enterprise-affiliated party,” however,
refers to directors, officers, employees,
shareholders, consultants, partners, and
other persons (as determined by the
Director) affiliated with Fannie, Freddie,
or the Federal Home Loan Banks. 
Independent contractors (such as attorneys
or accountants) also meet the definition of
“enterprise-affiliated party” if they
participate in violations of law or
regulation, breaches of fiduciary duty, or
unsafe and unsound practices that have a
significant adverse impact on a regulated
entity.  (Sec. 101)
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Provision H.R. 1461 (as reported) H.R. 1461 (as introduced) S. 190
Agency Officials (1) A Director, appointed by the President,
with the advice and consent of the Senate,
to a five-year term.  (2) Deputy Directors,
appointed by the Director, for Divisions of
Enterprise Regulation, Home Loan Bank
Regulation, and Housing.  (Sec. 101) 
(1) A Director, appointed by the President,
with the advice and consent of the Senate,
to a five-year term.  (2) Deputy Directors,
appointed by the Director, for Divisions of
Enterprise Regulation, Home Loan Bank
Regulation, and Housing.  (Sec. 101) 
(1) A Director, appointed by the President,
with the advice and consent of the Senate,
to a six-year term.  (2) Deputy Directors,
appointed by the Director, for Divisions of
Enterprise Regulation, Home Loan Bank
Supervision, and Housing Mission and
Goals.  (Sec. 101)   An  Inspector General
of the Agency.  (Sec. 105)
Qualifications of
Agency Officials
U.S. citizens, with a demonstrated
understanding of financial management or
oversight and housing finance, with
additional specialized experience and
knowledge requirements for the Deputy
Director positions.  (Sec. 101)
U.S. citizens, with a demonstrated
understanding of financial management or
oversight and housing finance, with
additional specialized experience and
knowledge requirements for the Deputy
Director positions.  (Sec. 101)
U.S. citizens, with a demonstrated
understanding of financial management or
oversight and housing finance, with
additional specialized experience
requirements for the Deputy Director
positions.  (Sec. 101)
CRS-8




To oversee the prudential operations of
regulated entities and to ensure that each
entity (1) operates in a safe and sound
manner and maintains adequate capital
and internal controls, (2) fosters well-
functioning housing finance markets
(including low- and moderate-income
housing), (3) complies with applicable
laws and regulations, and (4) engages only
in activities authorized by statute. The
Director may review and reject attempts to
acquire a controlling interest in a regulated
entity.  The Director may exercise
necessary and appropriate incidental
powers to fulfill the Agency’s duties and
responsibilities.  The Director shall be a
member of the Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Council. 
(Sec. 102)
To oversee the prudential operations of
regulated entities and to ensure that each
entity (1) operates in a safe and sound
manner and maintains adequate capital and
internal controls, (2) fosters well-
functioning housing finance markets
(including low- and moderate-income
housing), (3) complies with applicable laws
and regulations, and (4) engages only in
activities authorized by statute. The
Director may review and reject attempts to
acquire a controlling interest in a regulated
entity.  The Director may exercise
necessary and appropriate incidental
powers to fulfill the Agency’s duties and
responsibilities.  (Sec. 102)
To oversee the prudential operations of
regulated entities and to ensure that each
entity (1) operates in a safe and sound
manner and maintains adequate capital
and internal controls, (2) fosters well-
functioning housing finance markets
(including low- and moderate-income
housing), (3) complies with applicable
laws and regulations, (4) engages only in
activities authorized by statute, (5) serves
the public interest, and (6) remains
adequately capitalized, after consideration
of the risk to such entity.  The Director
may review and reject attempts to acquire
a controlling interest in a regulated entity. 
The Director may exercise necessary and
appropriate incidental powers to fulfill the
Agency’s duties and responsibilities. 
(Sec. 102)
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The Director shall establish standards for
each regulated entity regarding (1) internal
controls and information systems, (2)
internal audit systems, (3) credit and
counterparty risk, (4) interest rate risk
management, (5) monitoring and
management of market risk, (6) adequacy
and maintenance of liquidity and reserves,
(7) asset and portfolio management, (8)
investments and acquisitions, (9) record
keeping, (10) issuance of subordinated
debt, as the Director considers necessary,
(11) overall risk management, including
backup facilities to protect against
disruptive events, and (12) other standards
the Director determines to be  appropriate. 
(Sec. 102)
The Director shall establish standards for
each regulated entity regarding (1) internal
controls and information systems, (2)
internal audit systems, (3) credit and
counterparty risk, (4) interest rate risk
management, (5) monitoring and
management of market risk, (6) adequacy
and maintenance of liquidity and reserves,
(7) asset and portfolio management, (8)
investments and acquisitions, (9) record
keeping, (10) issuance of subordinated
debt, as the Director considers necessary,
(11) overall risk management, including
backup facilities to protect against
disruptive events, and (12) other standards
the Director determines to be  appropriate. 
(Sec. 102)
The Director may establish standards for
the enterprises regarding (1) internal
controls and information systems, (2)
internal audit systems, (3) interest rate risk
management, (4) monitoring and
management of market risk, (5) adequacy
and maintenance of liquidity and reserves,
(7) asset and portfolio growth, (8) overall
risk management, including backup
facilities to protect against disruptive
events, and (9) other standards deemed to
be appropriate.  (Sec. 108)
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Provision H.R. 1461 (as reported) H.R. 1461 (as introduced) S. 190
Failure to Meet
Prudential Standards
If the Director finds that a regulated entity
has failed to meet one of the above
standards, the entity shall (within 30 days)
submit a plan to correct the deficiency.  If
the deficiency is not corrected, the
Director may prohibit the entity from
increasing its total assets, may require an
increase in regulatory capital, or take other
measures.  (Sec. 102)
If the Director finds that a regulated entity
has failed to meet one of the above
standards, the entity shall (within 30 days)
submit a plan to correct the deficiency.  If
the deficiency is not corrected, the Director
may prohibit the entity from increasing its
total assets, may require an increase in






The Director is authorized to require
regulated entities to submit regular reports
on their operations and financial
condition.  Regulated entities would be
required to report in a timely manner the
discovery of a purchase or sale of a
fraudulent loan.
(Sec. 104) 
The Director is authorized to require
regulated entities to submit regular reports
on their operations and financial condition.  
(Sec. 104) 
The Director is authorized to require
regulated entities to submit regular
reports, including financial statements
determined on a fair value basis.  (Sec.
104)   Regulated entities would be
required to report in a timely manner the
discovery of a purchase or sale of a
fraudulent loan.  
(Sec. 112)  
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Provision H.R. 1461 (as reported) H.R. 1461 (as introduced) S. 190
Advisory Board Creates the Housing Finance Oversight
Board (made up of the Director, the
Secretaries of the Treasury and HUD, or
their designees, and two individuals with
relevant experience appointed by the
President to 3-year terms, with the advice
and consent of the Senate) to advise the
Director on overall strategies and policies. 
The Board is to meet at least every 3
months, and testify to Congress annually
on the safety and soundness, operational
status, and mission performance of the
regulated entities, and the operations and
performance of the Agency and Board. 
(Sec. 103)
Creates the Housing Finance Oversight
Board (made up of the Director, the
Secretaries of the Treasury and HUD, or
their designees, and two individuals with
relevant experience appointed by the
President to 3-year terms, with the advice
and consent of the Senate) to advise the
Director on overall strategies and policies. 
The Board is to meet at least every 3
months, and testify to Congress annually on
the safety and soundness, operational
status, and mission performance of the
regulated entities, and the operations and
performance of the Agency and Board. 
(Sec. 103)
Creates the Federal Housing Enterprise
Board (made up of the Director, the
Secretaries of the Treasury and HUD, and
the Chairman of the SEC) to advise the
Director on overall strategies and policies. 
The Board is to meet at least every 3
months, and testify to Congress annually
on the safety and soundness of the
regulated entities and the performance of
the Agency.  (Sec. 103)
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Provision H.R. 1461 (as reported) H.R. 1461 (as introduced) S. 190
Assessments and
Appropriations
The Director shall establish and collect
annual assessments from the regulated
entities, in amounts sufficient to provide
for reasonable costs and expenses of the
Agency, including (1) costs of
examinations, reviews, and credit
assessments, and (2) amounts in excess of
actual expenses to maintain necessary
working capital. Assessments may be
increased if necessary to cover costs of
enforcement activities or if an entity is
inadequately capitalized.  Salaries and
other expenses of the Agency shall be paid
from assessments, which shall not be
construed to be government funds or
appropriated monies.  The Agency shall
provide OMB with financial plans and
forecasts, prepare annual financial
statements (including an assertion of the
effectiveness of internal accounting
controls), and be audited annually by
GAO (at the Agency’s expense).  
(Sec. 105)
The Director shall establish and collect
annual assessments from the regulated
entities, in amounts sufficient to provide
for reasonable costs and expenses of the
Agency, including (1) costs of
examinations, reviews, and credit
assessments, and (2) amounts in excess of
actual expenses to maintain necessary
working capital.  Salaries and other
expenses of the Agency shall be paid from
assessments, which shall not be construed
to be government funds or appropriated
monies.  The Agency shall provide OMB
with financial plans and forecasts, and be
audited by GAO at least every 3 years. 
(Sec. 105)
The Director shall establish and collect
annual assessments from the regulated
entities, in amounts sufficient to provide
for reasonable costs and expenses of the
Agency, including (1) costs of
examinations, reviews, and credit
assessments, and (2) amounts in excess of
actual expenses to maintain necessary
working capital.  Salaries and other
expenses of the Agency shall be paid from
assessments, which shall not be construed
to be government funds or appropriated
monies.  (Sec. 106)
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Provision H.R. 1461 (as reported) H.R. 1461 (as introduced) S. 190
Direct Hire Authority Director may hire examiners, accountants,
specialists in technology or financial
markets, and economists in accordance
with rules governing the excepted service,
notwithstanding any rules governing the
competitive service.  (Sec. 106)
Director may hire examiners, accountants,
and economists in accordance with rules
governing the excepted service,
notwithstanding any rules governing the
competitive service.  (Sec. 106)
Director may hire examiners, accountants,
economists, and specialists in financial
markets and technology in accordance
with rules governing the excepted service,
notwithstanding any rules governing the





The prohibition (in current law) of
executive compensation that is not
reasonable or comparable is amended by
permitting the Director to take into
account wrongdoing on the part of the
executive, and to hold pay in escrow while
a determination is made.  (Sec. 107)
The prohibition (in current law) of
executive compensation that is not
reasonable or comparable is amended by
permitting the Director to take into account
wrongdoing on the part of the executive,
and to hold pay in escrow while a




The Director is authorized to issue any
regulations, guidelines, or orders that are
necessary to carry out the authorizing
statutes.  (Sec. 109)
The Director is authorized to issue any
regulations, guidelines, or orders that are
necessary to carry out the authorizing
statutes.  (Sec. 109)
The Director is authorized to issue any
regulations, directives, guidelines, or
orders that are necessary to carry out the




The Director shall periodically review the
on-balance sheet assets and off-balance
sheet obligations of the enterprises, and
may order the disposition or acquisition of
any asset or obligation, if the Director
determines that such action is consistent
with safe and sound operation.  (Sec. 112)
The Director shall periodically review the
on-balance sheet assets and off-balance
sheet obligations of the enterprises, and
may order the disposition or acquisition of
any asset or obligation, if the Director
determines that such action is consistent
with safe and sound operation.  (Sec. 112)
Authorizes the Director to determine the
type and amount of nonmission-related
assets that an enterprise may hold at any
time.  Any regulation issued for this
purpose shall include a definition of
“nonmission-related asset.”  (Sec. 109)
CRS-14




The Director shall, by regulation, establish
risk-based capital requirements for the
enterprises to ensure safe and sound
operation and maintenance of sufficient
capital and reserves to support risk
exposure.   The Director shall establish
risk-based capital requirements for the
Federal Home Loan Banks. 
Confidentiality of information enabling
risk-based capital standards shall be
maintained.
(Sec. 110)
The Director shall, by regulation, establish
risk-based capital requirements for the
enterprises to ensure safe and sound
operation and maintenance of sufficient
capital and reserves to support risk
exposure.   The Director shall establish
risk-based capital requirements for the
Federal Home Loan Banks.
(Sec. 110)
The Director shall, by regulation, establish
risk-based capital requirements for each
regulated entity, to ensure safe and sound
operation and maintenance of sufficient
capital and reserves to support risk




The Director may, by regulation, establish
minimum capital levels for regulated
entities that are higher than the statutory
levels.  The Director may, by order or
regulation, establish a capital or reserve
requirement with respect to a particular
program or activity, to ensure that the
entity operates in a safe and sound
manner.  The Director shall, by regulation,
establish a critical capital level for the
Home Loan Banks. (Sec. 111)
The Director may, by regulation, establish
minimum capital levels for regulated
entities that are higher than the statutory
levels.  The Director may, by order or
regulation, establish a capital or reserve
requirement with respect to a particular
program or activity, to ensure that the
entity operates in a safe and sound manner. 
The Director shall, by regulation, establish
a critical capital level for the Home Loan
Banks. (Sec. 111)
With regard to the enterprises (Fannie and
Freddie), the Director may establish
minimum capital levels that are higher
than those specified in the statute.  
(Sec. 110)
CRS-15
Provision H.R. 1461 (as reported) H.R. 1461 (as introduced) S. 190
SEC Registration
Requirements
Requires each regulated entity to register
at least one class of capital stock with the
SEC, and requires enterprises (Fannie and
Freddie) to comply with Sections 14 and
16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(which deal with proxy reporting and
disclosure of insider transactions in
company stock). Enterprises whose stock
is not registered or is deregistered remain
subject to certain provisions of the
Securities Exchange Act.  (Sec. 114) 
Requires each regulated entity to register at
least one class of capital stock with the
SEC, and requires enterprises (Fannie and
Freddie) to comply with Sections 14 and 16
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(which deal with proxy reporting and
disclosure of insider transactions in
company stock).  Enterprises whose stock
is not registered or is deregistered remain
subject to certain provisions of the
Securities Exchange Act. (Sec. 110) 
Requires each regulated entity to register
at least one class of capital stock with the
SEC, and requires enterprises (Fannie and
Freddie) to comply with Sections 14 and
16 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, which deal with proxy reporting and
disclosure of insider transactions in
company stock.  (Sec. 110)  Sec. 205 (see
below) exempts the Federal Home Loan





Requires a majority of the board to be
independent directors, as defined by the
NYSE.  Requires boards to meet at least
eight times a year, and requires non-
management directors to meet regularly in
executive session without management
participation.   (Sec. 113)
Limits board tenure to ten years, and
membership to those under 72 years of age. 
Requires a majority of the board to be
independent directors, as defined by the
NYSE.  Requires boards to meet at least
eight times a year, and requires non-
management directors to meet regularly in
executive session without management
participation.  (Sec. 113)
No comparable provision
CRS-16
Provision H.R. 1461 (as reported) H.R. 1461 (as introduced) S. 190
Compensation by
Enterprises
Compensation of directors, executives,
and employees shall not exceed what is
reasonable and appropriate, shall be
commensurate with duties and
responsibilities, consistent with the long-
term goals of the enterprise, shall not
focus solely on earnings performance. 
Enterprises are made subject to Section
304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which
requires CEOs and CFOs to reimburse the
company under certain circumstances after
an accounting restatement. (Sec. 113)
The compensation of directors, officers,
and employees of an enterprise shall not be
in excess of what is reasonable and
appropriate, shall be commensurate with
duties and responsibilities, consistent with
the enterprise’s long-term goals, and shall
not focus solely on earnings performance
(but shall also take into account risk
management, operational stability, and
legal and regulatory compliance).  
(Sec. 113)
No comparable provision
Code of Conduct and
Ethics
An enterprise shall establish and enforce a
written code of conduct designed to ensure
that directors, officers, and employees act
in an impartial and objective manner,
including standards under section 406 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  (Sec. 113)
An enterprise shall establish and enforce a
written code of conduct designed to ensure
that directors, officers, and employees act
in an impartial and objective manner,
including standards under section 406 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  (Sec. 113)
No comparable provision
CRS-17




The board of an enterprise shall oversee
(1) corporate strategy, risk policy, and
compliance programs, (2) hiring and
retention of qualified executives, (3)
compensation programs, (4) the integrity
of accounting and financial reporting
systems, (5) disclosures to shareholders
and investors, (6) extensions of credit to
officers and directors, and (7)
responsiveness in reporting to federal
regulators.  (Sec. 113)
The board of an enterprise shall oversee (1)
corporate strategy, risk policy, and
compliance programs, (2) hiring and
retention of qualified executives, (3)
compensation programs, (4) the integrity of
accounting and financial reporting systems,
(5) disclosures to shareholders and
investors, (6) extensions of credit to
officers and directors, and (7)
responsiveness in reporting to federal




An enterprise may not (directly, indirectly,
or through a subsidiary) make any
personal loan to a board member or
executive officer.  (Sec. 113)
An enterprise may not (directly, indirectly,
or through a subsidiary) make any personal
loan to a board member or executive




The CEO and CFO of an enterprise shall
review annual and quarterly reports and
shall make the certifications required by
section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
(Sec. 113)
The CEO and CFO of an enterprise shall
review annual and quarterly reports and
shall make the certifications required by





Requires that the lead partner of the
external auditor of an enterprise be
changed every five years.   (Sec. 113)
Requires that the lead partner of the
external auditor of an enterprise be changed
every five years.   (Sec. 113)
No comparable provision
CRS-18
Provision H.R. 1461 (as reported) H.R. 1461 (as introduced) S. 190
Compliance Program Each enterprise shall establish a
compliance program reasonably designed
to ensure that the enterprise complies with
applicable laws, regulations, and internal
controls. The program shall be headed by
a compliance officer, who reports directly
to the CEO and regularly to the board. 
(Sec. 113)
Each enterprise shall establish a
compliance program reasonably designed
to ensure that the enterprise complies with
applicable laws, regulations, and internal
controls. The program shall be headed by a
compliance officer, who reports directly to





Each enterprise shall establish a risk
management program reasonably designed
to manage the risks of operation.  The
program shall be headed by a risk
management officer, who reports directly
to the CEO and regularly to the board. 
(Sec. 113)
Each enterprise shall establish a risk
management program reasonably designed
to manage the risks of operation.  The
program shall be headed by a risk
management officer, who reports directly






No comparable provision, but such
payments could be subject to the
“reasonable and appropriate” tests in
Section 113(c).
No comparable provision, but such
payments could be subject to the
“reasonable and appropriate” tests in
Section 113(c).
The Agency may prohibit or limit, by
regulation or order, any golden parachute
or indemnification payment that would be
received by any enterprise-affiliated party
after an enterprise became insolvent, was
determined to be in a troubled condition,
or following the appointment of a
conservator or receiver.  (Sec. 111)
CRS-19
Provision H.R. 1461 (as reported) H.R. 1461 (as introduced) S. 190
Reporting of
Fraudulent Loans
No comparable provision No comparable provision The Director shall, by regulation, require
enterprises to timely disclose the
discovery of the purchase or sale of a
fraudulent loan.  (Sec. 112)
Subtitle B:  Improvement of Mission Supervision.
Affordable Housing
Goals
Program and housing goal oversight is
transferred from HUD to the Agency. 
(Sec. 121)
Program and housing goal oversight is
transferred from HUD to the Agency.  
(Sec. 121)
Oversight of affordable housing goals is
transferred from Secretary of HUD to the
Director.  HUD retains fair housing
responsibilities.  (Secs. 124-126)   The
Inspector General of the Agency shall
conduct an annual audit of affordable
housing programs.  (Sec. 402) 
CRS-20





Enterprises may not undertake new
programs or business activities without the
Director’s prior approval.  Approval is
contingent upon consistency with statutory
authority, safety and soundness, and the
public interest.  The Director may prohibit
any activity that is inconsistent with the
law, otherwise inconsistent with safety
and soundness, or not in the public
interest.  Requires enterprises to submit a
report to the director describing each
program and business activity within 180
days of enactment.  (Sec. 122)
Enterprises may not commence new
programs or business activities without the
Director’s prior approval.  Approval is
contingent upon consistency with statutory
authority, safety and soundness, and the
public interest.  The Director may prohibit
any activity that is inconsistent with the
law, otherwise inconsistent with safety and
soundness, or not in the public interest. 
Requires enterprises to submit a report to
the director describing each program and
business activity within 180 days of
enactment.  (Sec. 122)
Prior approval authority is transferred
from HUD to the Director.  (Sec. 121)   
Authorizes the Director to review any
enterprise activities, to determine their
conformance with the purposes of the
statutes, and to protect the safety and
soundness of the enterprises.  The Director
may prohibit or limit any activities found
to be impermissible or inappropriate. 
(Sec. 122)
Mission Clarification Within 6 months of the effective date of
this legislation, the Director shall, by
regulation, define “primary mortgage
market” and “secondary mortgage
market.”  (Sec. 122)
Within 6 months of the effective date of
this legislation, the Director shall, by
regulation, define “primary mortgage
market” and “secondary mortgage market.” 
(Sec. 122)
The Director shall define by regulation
“loan origination,” establishing thereby
which activities are impermissible for the
enterprises.  The Director shall define the
boundary between the secondary mortgage
market (where the enterprises are allowed
to operate) and the primary mortgage
market (where they are not). 
Grandfathering of enterprise activities that
do not accord with these definitions is not
automatically presumed, but may be
permitted by the Director.  (Sec. 107)
CRS-21
Provision H.R. 1461 (as reported) H.R. 1461 (as introduced) S. 190
Conforming Loan
Limits
Sets conforming loan limits and requires
the Agency to make annual adjustments to
the limits based on increases or decreases
in a housing price index maintained by the
Agency.  The accuracy of the housing
price index is to be audited by GAO.  For
high-cost metropolitan statistical areas, the
conforming loan limit is raised to the
lesser of 150% of the statutory limit or the
median home price in that area. (Sec. 123)
Sets conforming loan limits and requires
the Agency to make annual adjustments to
the limits based on increases or decreases
in a housing price index maintained by the
Agency.  The accuracy of the housing price




The Director shall report annually to the
House Financial Services and Senate
Banking Committees on the achievement
of housing goals, actions to promote or
expand goals, to expand opportunities for
first-time home buyers, fair housing
issues, and conditions in housing markets. 
To assist in the preparation of this report,
the Director shall conduct a monthly
survey of housing markets.  (Sec. 124)
The Director shall report annually to the
House Financial Services and Senate
Banking Committees on the achievement of
housing goals, actions to promote or
expand goals, to expand opportunities for
first-time home buyers, fair housing issues,
and on conditions in housing markets.  To
assist in the preparation of this report, the
Director shall conduct a monthly survey of
housing markets.  (Sec. 124)
No comparable provision
CRS-22




The Director shall establish goals, with
annual targets, for the purchases of
mortgage loans made to low and very low
income families, or families in low
income areas.  Annual goals shall also be
established for purchases of mortgages on
multifamily housing units serving very
low income families, or units assisted by
the low-income housing tax credit.  
(Sec. 125)
Creates a duty to serve underserved
markets, by undertaking activities related
to mortgages on housing for low, very
low, and moderate income familes,
including manufactured housing.  
(Sec. 126)
The Director shall establish housing goals
for each enterprise, including low- and
moderate-income housing goals, affordable
housing goals, underserved area goals, and
home purchase goals.  
(Sec. 125)
The Director shall establish a home
purchase goal for each enterprise for
mortgages including the following: first-
time buyers, low- and moderate-income
buyers, buyers in underserved areas, and








Upon a written finding that an enterprise
has failed to meet a housing goal, the
Director is authorized to take any of
several steps to enforce compliance,
including cease-and-desist orders, refusal
to authorize new programs, and civil
money penalties not to exceed $50,000 per
day.  Other sanctions may include a
prohibition on new activities or programs. 
(Sec. 127)  
Upon a written finding that an enterprise
has failed to meet a housing goal, the
Director is authorized to take any of several
steps to enforce compliance, including
cease-and-desist orders, refusal to authorize
new programs, and civil money penalties
not to exceed $50,000 per day.  Other
sanctions may include a prohibition on new




Each enterprise shall establish an
affordable housing fund to increase
homeownership among very- and
extremely-low income families, to
increase investment in housing in low
income and economically distressed areas,
and to increase and preserve the supply of
rental and owner-occupied housing for
very- and extremely-low income families. 
Each enterprise shall allocate to this fund
3.5% of its after-tax income during the
first year after enactment, and 5% in
subsequent years.  No allocation would be
required when an enterprise was less than
adequately capitalized.  (Sec. 128)
No comparable provision No comparable provision
CRS-24
Provision H.R. 1461 (as reported) H.R. 1461 (as introduced) S. 190
Affordable Housing
Board
The Director shall appoint an affordable
housing board, whose members shall
include the Secretaries of HUD and
Agriculture (or their designees), and 2
persons each from (1) businesses and (2)
non-profits actively engaged in promoting
or providing housing for very- or
extremely-low income households.  The
board shall determine very- and
extremely-low income housing needs and
advise the director on priorities for the use
of the affordable housing funds.  
(Sec. 128)
No comparable provision No comparable provision
Subtitle C:  Prompt Corrective Action.
Capital
Classifications
The Director may reclassify a regulated
entity (1) whose conduct could rapidly
deplete core or total capital, or (in the case
of an enterprise) whose mortgage assets
have declined significantly in value, or (2)
which is determined (after notice and
opportunity for a hearing) to be in an
unsafe or unsound condition.   (Sec. 141)
The Director may reclassify a regulated
entity (1) whose conduct could rapidly
deplete core or total capital, or (in the case
of an enterprise) whose mortgage assets
have declined significantly in value, or (2)
which is determined (after notice and
opportunity for a hearing) to be in an
unsafe or unsound condition.   (Sec. 141)
The Director may reclassify a regulated
entity whose conduct could rapidly deplete
core capital, or whose mortgage assets
have declined significantly in value, or
which is determined (after notice and
opportunity for a hearing) to be in an
unsafe or unsound condition.    (Sec. 141)
CRS-25
Provision H.R. 1461 (as reported) H.R. 1461 (as introduced) S. 190
Restriction on
Capital Distributions
A regulated entity shall make no capital
distribution that would cause it to become
undercapitalized, except as permitted by
the Director under certain circumstances. 
(Sec. 141)
A regulated entity shall make no capital
distribution that would cause it to become
undercapitalized, except as permitted by
the Director under certain circumstances. 
(Sec. 141)
A regulated entity shall make no capital
distribution that would cause it to become
undercapitalized, except as permitted by






The Director must monitor the entity’s
condition, its compliance with its capital
restoration plan, and the efficacy of the
plan.  No growth in total assets is
permitted for an undercapitalized GSE,
unless the director has accepted the GSE’s
capital restoration plan, an increase in
assets is consistent with the plan, and the
ratio of tangible equity to assets is
increasing.  No new activities or
acquisitions permitted without the
Director’s prior approval and
determination that such activities would
be consistent with the capital restoration
plan.  Actions that may be taken under
current law with regard to significantly
undercapitalized GSEs may be taken with
regard to undercapitalized GSEs.  
(Sec. 142)
The Director must monitor the entity’s
condition, its compliance with its capital
restoration plan, and the efficacy of the
plan.  No growth in total assets is permitted
for an undercapitalized GSE, unless the
director has accepted the GSE’s capital
restoration plan, an increase in assets is
consistent with the plan, and the ratio of
tangible equity to assets is increasing.  No
new activities or acquisitions permitted
without the Director’s prior approval and
determination that such activities would be
consistent with the capital restoration plan. 
Actions that may be taken under current
law with regard to significantly
undercapitalized GSEs may be taken with
regard to undercapitalized GSEs.  
(Sec. 142)
The Director must monitor the entity’s
condition, its compliance with its capital
restoration plan, and the efficacy of the
plan.  No growth in total assets is
permitted for an undercapitalized GSE,
unless the director has accepted the GSE’s
capital restoration plan, an increase in
assets is consistent with the plan, and the
ratio of tangible equity to assets is
increasing.  No new activities or
acquisitions permitted without the
Director’s prior approval and
determination that such activities would
be consistent with the capital restoration
plan.  Actions that may be taken under
current law with regard to significantly
undercapitalized GSEs may be taken with
regard to undercapitalized GSEs.  
(Sec. 142)
CRS-26






Supervisory actions that regulator may
take under current law must be taken,
including one or more of the following:
new election of directors, dismissal of
directors and/or executives, and hiring of
qualified executive officers, or other
actions.  Without prior written approval of
the Director, executives of a significantly
undercapitalized GSE may not receive
bonuses or pay raises.  (Sec. 143)
Supervisory actions that regulator may take
under current law must be taken, including
one or more of the following: new election
of directors, dismissal of directors and/or
executives, and hiring of qualified
executive officers, or other actions. 
Without prior written approval of the
Director, executives of a significantly
undercapitalized GSE may not receive
bonuses or pay raises.  (Sec. 143)
Supervisory actions that regulator may
take under current law must be taken,
including one or more of the following:
new election of directors, dismissal of
directors and/or executives, and hiring of
qualified executive officers, or other
actions.  Without prior written approval of
the Director, executives of a significantly
undercapitalized GSE may not receive







The Director may appoint (or the Agency
may serve as) a receiver or conservator for
several specified causes related to
financial difficulty and/or violations of
law or regulation.  Sets out powers of
conservators or receivers, and procedures
for settlement of claims and other aspects
of liquidation.  Authorizes the Director to
appoint a limited-life enterprise to deal
with the affairs of an enterprise in default. 
Prohibits a receiver from terminating or
revoking the charter of an enterprise. 
(Sec. 144)
The Director may appoint (or the Agency
may serve as) a receiver or conservator for
several specified causes related to financial
difficulty and/or violations of law or
regulation.  Sets out powers of conservators
or receivers, and procedures for settlement
of claims and other aspects of liquidation. 
Authorizes the Director to appoint a
limited-life enterprise to deal with the
affairs of an enterprise in default.  Prohibits
a receiver from terminating or revoking the
charter of an enterprise. 
 (Sec. 144)
The Director may appoint (or the Agency
may serve as) a receiver or conservator for
several specified causes related to
financial difficulty and/or violations of
law or regulation.  Sets out powers of
conservators or receivers, and procedures
for settlement of claims and other aspects
of liquidation.  Authorizes the Director to
appoint a limited-life enterprise to deal
with the affairs of an enterprise in default. 
Prohibits a receiver from terminating or
revoking the charter of an enterprise. 
(Sec. 144)
CRS-27
Provision H.R. 1461 (as reported) H.R. 1461 (as introduced) S. 190
Subtitle D:  Enforcement Actions.
Cease-and-Desist
Orders
The Director may issue cease-and-desist
orders against a regulated entity, a
regulated entity-affiliated party, or the
Federal Home Loan Bank Finance
Corporation (created by Sec. 204) for
unsafe or unsound practices (actual or
imminent), violations of laws and
regulations, or for a  less-than-satisfactory
rating where the identified deficiency is
not corrected.  (Sec. 161)
Temporary cease-and-desist orders may be
issued if actions taken (or not taken) by
the regulated entity are likely to cause
insolvency or weaken its financial
condition prior to the conclusion of a
cease-and-desist proceeding.  (Sec. 162)
The Director may issue cease-and-desist
orders against a regulated entity, a
regulated entity-affiliated party, or the
Federal Home Loan Bank Finance
Corporation (created by Sec. 204) for
unsafe or unsound practices (actual or
imminent), violations of laws and
regulations, or for a  less-than-satisfactory
rating where the identified deficiency is not
corrected.  (Sec. 161)
Temporary cease-and-desist orders may be
issued if actions taken (or not taken) by the
regulated entity are likely to cause
insolvency or weaken its financial
condition prior to the conclusion of a cease-
and-desist proceeding.  (Sec. 162)
The Director may issue cease-and-desist
orders against a regulated entity, an entity-
affiliated party, or the Federal Home Loan
Bank Finance Corporation (created by
Sec. 204) for unsafe or unsound practices
(actual or imminent), violations of laws
and regulations, or for a  less-than-
satisfactory rating where the identified
deficiency is not corrected.  (Sec. 151)
Temporary cease-and-desist orders may be
issued if actions taken (or not taken) by
the regulated entity are likely to cause
insolvency or weaken its financial
condition prior to the conclusion of a
cease-and-desist proceeding.  (Sec. 152)
CRS-28
Provision H.R. 1461 (as reported) H.R. 1461 (as introduced) S. 190
Removal and
Prohibition Authority
After written notice and opportunity for a
hearing, the Director may suspend or
remove regulated entity-affiliated parties
who have (1) violated a law or a cease-
and-desist or other written order, (2)
engaged in an unsafe or unsound practice,
or (3) breached fiduciary duty, such that
(1) the regulated entity is likely to suffer
loss or the enterprise affiliated party gain,
and (2) the unsafe or unsound practice
involves personal dishonesty or
demonstrates willful and continuing
disregard for the safety and soundness of
the regulated entity.  Also provides for
industry-wide suspensions under certain
circumstances.  Provides for judicial
review of such orders or suspensions. 
(Sec. 166)
After written notice and opportunity for a
hearing, the Director may suspend or
remove regulated entity-affiliated parties
who have (1) violated a law or a cease-and-
desist or other written order, (2) engaged in
an unsafe or unsound practice, or (3)
breached fiduciary duty, such that (1) the
regulated entity is likely to suffer loss or
the enterprise affiliated party gain, and (2)
the unsafe or unsound practice involves
personal dishonesty or demonstrates willful
and continuing disregard for the safety and
soundness of the regulated entity.  Also
provides for industry-wide suspensions
under certain circumstances.  Provides for
judicial review of such orders or
suspensions.  (Sec. 165)
After written notice and opportunity for a
hearing, the Director may suspend or
remove enterprise-affiliated parties, or
officers of the Federal Home Loan Bank
Finance Corporation, who have (1)
violated a law or a cease-and-desist or
other written order, (2) engaged in an
unsafe or unsound practice, or 3) breached
fiduciary duty, such that (1) the regulated
entity is likely to suffer loss or the
enterprise affiliated party gain, and (2) the
unsafe or unsound practice demonstrates
continuing disregard for the safety and
soundness of the regulated entity.  Also
provides for industry-wide suspensions
under certain circumstances.  Provides for
judicial review of such orders or
suspensions.  (Sec. 153)
Enforcement and
Jurisdiction
Authorizes the Director to apply to
Federal District Court for enforcement of
outstanding notice or order, and to request
the Attorney General to bring actions for
that purpose.  (Sec. 164)
Authorizes the Director to apply to Federal
District Court for enforcement of
outstanding notice or order, and to request
the Attorney General to bring actions for
that purpose.  (Sec. 164)
Authorizes the Director to apply to
Federal District Court for enforcement of
outstanding orders or subpoenas, and to
request the Attorney General to bring
actions for that purpose.  (Sec. 154)
CRS-29
Provision H.R. 1461 (as reported) H.R. 1461 (as introduced) S. 190
Civil Money
Penalties
Establishes three tiers of fines: (1)
$10,000 per day for violations of orders,
etc., (2) $50,000 per day for recklessly
engaging in an unsafe or unsound practice,
or a pattern of misconduct or material
breach of fiduciary duty with financial
gain to the entity or individual, and (3) up
to a maximum of $2 million per day for
knowingly engaging in violations,
breaches of fiduciary duties, or unsafe or
unsound practices that cause substantial
losses to a regulated entity.  (Sec. 165)
Establishes three tiers of fines: (1) $10,000
per day for violations of orders, etc., (2)
$50,000 per day for recklessly engaging in
an unsafe or unsound practice, or a pattern
of misconduct or material breach of
fiduciary duty with financial gain to the
entity or individual, and (3) up to a
maximum of $2 million per day for
knowingly engaging in violations, breaches
of fiduciary duties, or unsafe or unsound
practices that cause substantial losses to a
regulated entity.  (Sec. 164)
Establishes three tiers of fines: (1)
$10,000 per day for violations of orders,
etc., (2) $50,000 per day for a pattern of
misconduct or material breach of fiduciary
duty with financial gain to the entity or
individual, and (3) up to a maximum of $2
million for knowingly engaging in
violations, breaches of fiduciary duties, or
unsafe or unsound practices that cause
substantial losses to a regulated entity. 
(Sec. 155)
Criminal Penalties Anyone who participates directly or
indirectly in the affairs of a regulated
entity while under suspension or order of
removal shall be liable for a fine of up to
$1 million, or five years imprisonment. 
(Sec. 167)
Anyone who participates directly or
indirectly in the affairs of a regulated entity
while under suspension or order of removal
shall be liable for a fine of up to $1 million,
or five years imprisonment.  (Sec. 166)
Anyone who participates directly or
indirectly in the affairs of a regulated
entity while under suspension or order of
removal shall be liable for a fine of up to
$1 million, or five years imprisonment. 
(Sec. 156)
CRS-30
Provision H.R. 1461 (as reported) H.R. 1461 (as introduced) S. 190
Studies and Reports
Required
In addition to the study in Section 182
(described to the right), the reported bill
calls for (1) a study by the Director of the
effect that restrictions on conforming loan
limits have on mortgage markets; (2) a
study on guarantee fees by the
Comptroller General in consultation with
the federal banking agencies and the new
director of the FHFA; (3) a review by the
GSEs of disparities in interest rates
charged on mortgages for minority
borrowers; (4) an affordable housing study
related to long-term-care facilities; and
(5) a study of alternative secondary
mortgage markets systems, such as
privatization or competition from new
GSEs.
The Director shall report to Congress
(within 12 months of the effective date of
this legislation) on (1) the portfolio
holdings of the enterprises, (2) the risk
implications of the portfolios, including the
use of derivatives as hedging instruments,
(3) the safety and soundness implications
of portfolio holdings, (4) whether the
portfolio holdings further the enterprise
missions, and (5) the systemic risk
implications of portfolio holdings, and
whether such holdings should be reduced
over time.  (Sec. 182)
(1) The Agency and federal bank
regulators shall report to Congress on
holdings of GSE debt by insured
depository institutions and whether such
holdings are a source of systemic risk.
(2) The Director, in consultation with
GAO, shall report to Congress on GSE
portfolio operations, risk management,
and mission.  (3) The Director shall report
to Congress on the appropriate level of
debt issuance by GSEs.  (4) The Director
shall submit a quarterly report to Congress
on the risk-based capital levels for the
enterprises.  (5) The GAO shall submit an
annual report to Congress, with
recommendations,  on the allocation of
resources within the Agency and the level
of assessments collected from the
regulated entities.  (Sec. 161)  
(6) The Federal Reserve shall study and
report to Congress on the effects of the
Basel II Capital Accord.  (Sec. 401)
CRS-31




Eliminates the requirement that five
directors on the boards of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac be appointed by the
President.  Reduces the size of enterprise
boards from 18 to between 7 and 15. 
(Sec. 181)
Eliminates the requirement that five
directors on the boards of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac be appointed by the President. 
(Sec. 181)
Abolishes the requirement that five
directors on the boards of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac be appointed by the
President.  (Sec. 172)
CRS-32
Provision H.R. 1461 (as reported) H.R. 1461 (as introduced) S. 190
Title II:  Federal Home Loan Bank Provisions.
Boards of Directors Provides that boards of FHLBs shall
contain 13 members, or such number as
the Director determines, all of whom shall
be U.S. citizens and elected by the
membership (none appointed).  A majority
of each board shall consist of member
directors — officers or directors of
member banks located in the FHLB
district.  At least one-third of the members
shall be independent directors: bona fide
residents of the bank district, at least two
of whom represent consumer or
community interests.   The remaining
independent directors shall have financial
or management expertise.  Independent
directors may not serve as officers of a
FHLB or a member bank. Terms of
service are set at four (rather than three)
years.  The cap on director compensation
is lifted, but compensation must be
reasonable and appropriate.   (Sec. 202)
Provides that boards of Federal Home Loan
Banks shall contain 13 (rather than the
present 14) members, all of whom shall be
elected by the membership (none
appointed).  The boards shall include
member directors — officers or directors of
member banks located in the bank district
— and nonmember directors, who shall be
residents of the bank district, and at least
two of whom are representatives of
consumer or community interests. The cap
on director compensation is lifted, but
compensation must be reasonable and
appropriate.  Directors’ terms are set at four
(rather than three) years.   (Sec. 202)
Provides that all directors of Federal
Home Loan Banks shall be elected by the
membership.  The 13-member boards shall
include (1) member directors — officers
or directors of member banks located in
the bank district — and (2) nonmember
directors, who shall be residents of the
bank district, and who shall include at
least two representatives of consumer or
community interests. Directors’ terms are
extended from three to four years.  
(Sec. 201)
CRS-33
Provision H.R. 1461 (as reported) H.R. 1461 (as introduced) S. 190
Debt Issuing Facility No directly comparable provision, but
permits two or more FHLBs to establish a
joint office to provide services to Banks
on a common or collective basis.  The
FHLBs may require the Office of Finance
to provide such services as the banks are
authorized to perform or provide
individually.   (Sec. 204)
Establishes a Federal Home Loan Bank
Finance Corporation (as a jointly owned
subsidiary of the Federal Home Loan
Banks) to issue and service debt
obligations, to act as fiscal agent, and to
perform other functions currently
performed by the Office of Finance. 
Provides for a governing Board of
Directors, comprising the presidents of the
Federal Home Loan Banks, and sets out the
Board’s duties and powers.  (Sec. 204)
Establishes a Federal Home Loan Bank
Finance Corporation (as a jointly owned
subsidiary of the Federal Home Loan
Banks) to issue and service debt
obligations, to act as fiscal agent, and to
perform other functions now performed by
the Office of Finance.  Provides for a
governing Board of Directors, comprising
the presidents of the Federal Home Loan
Banks, and sets out the Board’s duties and
powers.  (Sec. 204)
FHLB Mergers and
Reorganization
Permits voluntary mergers between
FHLBs, subject to the approval and
regulation of the Director.   (Sec. 206)




Insured depository institutions with less
than $1 billion in assets may use Federal
Home Loan Bank advances for lending to
community development activities, and
use such secured loans as collateral for
advances generally.  (Sec. 208)
Insured depository institutions with less
than $1 billion in assets may use Federal
Home Loan Bank advances for lending to
community development activities, and use
such secured loans as collateral for
advances generally.  (Sec. 206)
No comparable provision
CRS-34





Exempts the Federal Home Loan Banks
from certain disclosure requirements with
regard to transactions involving capital
stock of the banks.  Shares of Federal
Home Loan Bank capital stock are defined
as “exempted securities.”  Debentures,
bonds, and other FHLB debt obligations
are defined as “exempted securities” and
“government securities.”   A person that
effects transactions in Federal Home Loan
Bank capital stock or other obligations is
excluded from the definition of
“government securities dealer.”  The
Federal Home Loan Banks shall be
exempt from reporting requirements
regarding related party transactions and
sale of unregistered securities.  Tender
offer rules shall not apply to transactions
in Federal Home Loan Bank capital stock.  
(Sec. 207)
Exempts the Federal Home Loan Banks
from certain disclosure requirements with
regard to transactions involving capital
stock of the banks.  Shares of Federal
Home Loan Bank capital stock are defined
as “exempted securities.”  Debentures,
bonds, and other FHLB debt obligations are
defined as “exempted securities” and
“government securities.”   A person that
effects transactions in Federal Home Loan
Bank capital stock or other obligations is
excluded from the definition of
“government securities dealer.”  The
Federal Home Loan Banks shall be exempt
from reporting requirements regarding
related party transactions and sale of
unregistered securities.  Tender offer rules
shall not apply to transactions in Federal
Home Loan Bank capital stock.  
(Sec. 205)
Exempts the Federal Home Loan Banks
from certain disclosure requirements with
regard to transactions involving capital
stock of the banks.  Shares of Federal
Home Loan Bank capital stock are defined
as “exempted securities.”  Debentures,
bonds, and other debt obligations are
defined as “exempted securities” and
“government securities.”   A person that
effects transactions in Federal Home Loan
Bank capital stock or other obligations is
excluded from the definition of
“government securities dealer.”  The
Federal Home Loan Banks shall be
exempt from reporting requirements
regarding related party transactions and
sale of unregistered securities.  Tender
offer rules shall not apply to transactions
in Federal Home Loan Bank capital stock.  
(Sec. 205)
CRS-35
Provision H.R. 1461 (as reported) H.R. 1461 (as introduced) S. 190
Limitations on
Golden Parachutes
No comparable provision No comparable provision The Agency may prohibit or limit, by
regulation or order, any golden parachute
or indemnification payment that would be
received by any affiliated party when there
is a reasonable basis to believe that the
party may have committed fraud or breach
of fiduciary duty that had a material
impact on the bank’s financial condition,
or where there is a reasonable basis to
believe that the party was substantially
responsible for the bank’s insolvency,
troubled condition, or for the appointment
of a conservator or receiver, and other
factors.  (As in Sec. 111, “golden
parachute” is defined as a post-
employment payment that would be
received by any enterprise-affiliated party
after an enterprise had become insolvent,
had been determined to be in a troubled
condition, or following the appointment of
a conservator or receiver.)  
(Sec. 206)
CRS-36






Various provisions dealing with abolition
of OFHEO and the FHFB, continuation of
certain regulations, transfer of property
and facilities, employee rights and
benefits, etc.  (Title III)
Various provisions dealing with abolition
of OFHEO and the FHFB, continuation of
certain regulations, transfer of property and
facilities, employee rights and benefits, etc. 
(Title III)
Various provisions dealing with abolition
of OFHEO and the FHFB, continuation of
certain regulations, transfer of property
and facilities, employee rights and
benefits, etc.  (Title III)
Effective Date One year after the date of enactment,
unless otherwise specified.  
(Secs. 184 and 210)
One year after the date of enactment, unless
otherwise specified.  
(Sec. 184)
The date of enactment, except as
specifically provided otherwise.    
(Sec. 173)
